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a b s t r a c t
International trade in wildlife is a key threat to biodiversity conservation. CITES, the Con-
vention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, seeks to
ensure international wildlife trade is sustainable, relying on trade bans and controls. How-
ever, there has been little comprehensive review of its effectiveness and here we review
approaches taken to regulate wildlife trade in CITES. Although assessing its effectiveness
is problematic, we assert that CITES boasts few measurable conservation successes. We
attribute this to: non-compliance, an over reliance on regulation, lack of knowledge and
monitoring of listed species, ignorance of market forces, and influence among CITES actors.
Tomore effectivelymanage tradewe argue that interventions should go beyond regulation
and should bemulti-faceted, reflecting the complexity of wildlife trade. To inform these in-
terventionswe assert an intensive research effort is needed around six key areas: (1) factors
undermining wildlife trade governance at the national level, (2) determining sustainable
harvest rates for, and adaptivemanagement of CITES species, (3) gaining the buy-in of local
communities in implementing CITES, (4) supply and demand based market interventions,
(5)means of quantifying illicit trade, and (6) political processes and influencewithin CITES.
© 2015 Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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1. Introduction and aims
Globally, overexploitation of wildlife resources is a key threat to biodiversity conservation, much of which takes place
for trade (Broad et al., 2003; Butchart et al., 2010). Although most trade occurs at the local and national level, large volumes
of international trade also takes place annually, which can diminish wildlife populations, cause species extirpations, and
ultimately threaten ecosystem function (Roe et al., 2002; Nijman, 2010; Smith et al., 2010; Duckworth et al., 2012). CITES,
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, which entered into force in 1975, is
the primarymechanism for regulating internationalwildlife trade (CITES, 2014a;Wijnstekers, 2011). It seeks to restrict trade
in c.35,000 species to sustainable levels using a combination of trade bans and controls. It is implemented bymember states
(or ‘Parties’, currently 180), through a system of permits, national legislation and enforcement mechanisms and nominated
national agencies (CITES, 2014a).
Despite near universal accession, high volumes of illegal trade in many CITES-listed species takes place annually (e.g.,
Rosen and Smith, 2010 and Phelps et al., 2010). This is worth an estimated USD20 billion a year globally (South and Wyatt,
2011) and is seemingly unsustainable in many cases. Declining populations of the tiger (Panthera tigris), Asian bear species,
and the extirpation of the Javan rhino (Rhinoceros sondaicus) in Vietnam in 2011, all high-value species subject to CITES
strictest trade controls, demonstrate the impact this trade can have on wildlife populations (Abensperg-Traun, 2009; Brook
et al., 2012). Similarly, poaching of rhino in Africa and volumes of elephant ivory in illegal trade are currently at record
levels (Biggs et al., 2013; Underwood et al., 2013) and illicit trade is causing declines in populations of other mammals
as well as birds, amphibians, reptiles, gastropods and marine fishes (e.g., Challender et al., 2014; Theile, 2005; Giles et al.,
2006; Herrera and Hennessey, 2007; Lyons and Natusch, 2011; Birdlife, 2011 and Rosen and Smith, 2010), which raises
fundamental questions about the efficacy and nature of current, regulatory interventions.
However, despite a large body of literature on CITES and claims it is effective (e.g., Huxley, 2000 and Fuchs, 2010), there
has been little comprehensive review of its efficacy (though see IUCN, 2001). Existing research has been species-specific
(e.g., Shepherd and Nijman, 2008; Burn et al., 2011 and Vincent et al., 2013), or examined the impacts of trade controls
more broadly (e.g., Rivalan et al., 2007 and Courchamp et al., 2006). In this paper we review typical and atypical approaches
taken to regulate wildlife trade in CITES, i.e. interventions prescribed in the Convention text as well as those developed
since, and critically evaluate its effectiveness. Although determining the efficacy of CITES is difficult, and though it may
have had many successes, these are not easily apparent and evidence suggests that CITES can list few clearly measurable
conservation successes. We argue that this can be attributed to five overarching factors: non-compliance, an over reliance
on regulation, lack of knowledge and monitoring of listed species, ignorance of market forces, and influence among CITES
actors. To more effectively manage trade we argue that interventions need to go beyond regulation and should be multi-
faceted, reflecting the inherent socio-economic and cultural complexity of wildlife trade. To inform such interventions we
assert an intensive research effort is needed and we outline six key areas where attention should be focused: (1) factors
undermining wildlife trade governance at the national level, (2) determining sustainable harvest rates for, and adaptive
management of CITES species, (3) gaining the buy-in of local communities in implementing CITES, (4) supply and demand
based market interventions, (5) means of quantifying illicit trade, and (6) political processes and influence within CITES.
2. Methodology
To inform our review we drew on the CITES and wider wildlife trade literature. Specifically, we searched for articles
in the Web of Science database [v.5.14] using the keywords ‘CITES’, ‘CITES effectiveness’ and ‘wildlife trade’, and Google
Scholar, and drew on key texts on CITES (e.g., Oldfield, 2003; Reeve, 2002 and Hutton and Dickson, 2000) for evidence
of its effectiveness, or otherwise, and contributing factors. Based on this evidence, we conceptualised overarching factors
currently shaping the effectiveness of CITES.
3. CITES
3.1. CITES structure
CITES entered into force to govern the import, (re-)export and introduction from the sea of approximately 1100 listed
species (CITES, 2014a; Wijnstekers, 2011). Although it initially lacked an expressly stated goal that it seeks to ensure
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sustainability in international trade, this is implied in Article IV (3) of the Convention text and is now explicitly stated as its
reason for existence (see Res. Conf. 14.2, Rev. CoP16).
CITES relies on the mutual recognition of national laws for implementation (Reeve, 2002). Parties accede to the
Convention voluntarily and are mandated to enact implementing legislation (Article XIII) and, inter alia, designate Scientific
and Management Authorities (Article IX). The roles of these Authorities include monitoring and advising on levels of trade,
ensuring it is not detrimental to the survival of species in the wild (the so-called Non-detriment Finding (NDF); see Section
2.2), and the granting of import and export permits (CITES, 2014b). The Parties are supported by a small, central Secretariat
to which they are legally required to submit annual reports on permits issued, and biennial reports on legislative, regulatory
and administrative implementation measures taken (Article VIII; CITES, 2014c). However, they are not required to report
centrally on illegal trade (though see Res. Conf. 11.3, Rev. CoP16).
In seeking compliance among Parties, CITES uses a combination of ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ (Reeve, 2002). This includes
capacity building (e.g., providing Parties with training and species identification manuals) and technical assistance. The
efficacy of Party legislation is also evaluated under the National Legislation Project (NLP) in terms of meeting the
requirements to implement the Convention (Vasquez, 2003). Conversely, the threat and establishment of trade sanctions
for listed species are used where Parties are non-compliant (e.g., failure to enact implementing legislation; Reeve, 2002).
However, non-compliance remains a problem and 31 Parties (as at 09/09/2013) are currently subject to recommendations
to suspend trade (CITES, 2014d; Reeve, 2006).
The Convention’s highest decision-making body is its Conference of the Parties (CoP) which meets every 2–3 years to
review progress on the conservation of listed species and, inter alia, consider proposals to amend Appendices I and II (see
Section 2.2; CITES, 2014e and Reeve, 2002). Non-Parties, technically qualified agencies and non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) also contribute to CoPs. Proposals, which may only be submitted by Parties are adopted subject to at least a two-
thirds majority vote of Parties present and voting (Article XV). New ‘rules’ in the form of Resolutions and Decisions are
also adopted at CoPs and have enabled CITES to develop with some flexibility, but unlike the Convention text they are not
legally binding (Bowman, 2013; CITES, 2014f; Cooney and Abensperg-Traun, 2013; Wijnstekers, 2011). Between meetings,
CoP responsibilities fall to the Standing Committee, which otherwise provides policy advice to the Secretariat, acts as the
Convention’s main compliance body, and oversees the Animals and Plants Committees, which themselves provide technical
support and expertise to decision-making (CITES, 2014g; Reeve, 2002).
3.2. Approaches to controlling international trade in CITES
Typical interventions in CITES comprise listing species in one of three Appendices with corresponding trade controls.
Listings are based on an assessment of threat from international trade evaluated against biological and trade criteria (CITES,
2014b). The current criteria (see Resolution Conf. 9.24, Rev. CoP16), were adopted in 1994, and explicitly adopted the
Precautionary Principle resolving that, ‘in case of uncertainty regarding the status of a species, or the impact of trade on the
conservation of a species, the Parties shall act in the best interest of the conservation of the species concerned and,when considering
proposals to amendAppendices I and II, adoptmeasures that are proportionate to the anticipated risks to the species’ (Wijnstekers,
2011). Currently, there are 35,497 species and 71 subspecies in the Appendices comprising 931 + 47 in Appendix I (3%),
34,419 + 11 in Appendix II (97%) and 147 + 13 in Appendix III (<1%) respectively (CITES, 2014h). Trade is subject to the
provisions of each appendix below:
Appendix I—Includes species threatened with extinction. Trade for commercial purposes is prohibited and only permitted
in exceptional circumstances, subject to the grant of import and export permits (Article III).
Appendix II—Includes species that could become threatened with extinction from international trade unless it is regulated.
Trade is subject to the grant of (re-)export permits based on a NDF, which is a declaration that trade in specimens of a given
species will not be detrimental to the survival of that species in the wild. This calls on Parties to limit trade such that species
are maintained throughout their range at levels consistent with their ecosystem roles and above levels at which they would
be eligible for inclusion in Appendix I (Article IV, 3).
Appendix III—Includes species for which trade is regulated by one Party, but that Party requests the cooperation of other
signatories in preventing unsustainable trade. Trade is subject to the grant of export permits (Article V).
Accurately listing species in the Appendices is fundamental to the effectiveness of CITES because it determines the trade
controls to which they are subject (Wijnstekers, 2011). Yet, while Res. Conf. 9.24 (Rev. CoP16) provides a scientific basis
for listing species, which proponents have to prove individual species meet, in reality decision-making is characterised by
eristic divides among Parties as well as non-state actors (e.g., Gehring and Ruffing, 2008 and Hutton, 2000). Both seek to
influence decision-making for economic, political, philosophical and even emotional, as well scientific reasons (see Section
3.5; Dickson, 2003 and Vincent et al., 2013). However, Parties can unilaterally opt out of controls for specific species, which is
achieved either by entering a reservation, which affects only a very small number of species in reality, or by adopting stricter
domestic measures (Article XIV). For example, as the EU does (see Morgan, 2003), and the US does under its Endangered
Species Act (1973).
Listing species in CITES also has cultural, socio-economic and broader economic implications. This is because it typically
restricts or prohibits their direct use, for example by rural communities in developing countries who may be dependent
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on wildlife for their livelihoods, adversely resulting in disincentives for conservation (e.g., Roe et al., 2002 and Velásquez
Gomar and Stringer, 2011). In recognition of the need to consider these factors in listing decisions, the Parties have adopted
a number of Resolutions and Decisions to this end (see Table 1). For example, Resolution Conf. 16.6 explicitly recognises
implications of decision-making on local livelihoods and the need to involve local communities in implementation, while
the need to consider economic conditions and market forces has also been recognised (Res. Conf. 13.2, Res. Conf. 14.2).
As CITES has developed a number of atypical interventions not originally prescribed or expressly contemplated in the
Convention text have also been adopted (see Table 2; IUCN, 2001 and Wijnstekers, 2011). They include ranching, which
entails the removal of eggs or juveniles from the wild which would otherwise have a very low probability of surviving to
adulthood, and rearing them in a controlled environment, and which is facilitated by the transfer of national populations
of Appendix I species to Appendix II thus enabling commercial trade. However, ranching has only been implemented for
crocodilians to date (see Table 2). Annual export quotas and annotations to the appendices have been adopted enabling
limited trade deemed sustainable, but these measures have also been used to prescribe stricter trade controls (e.g., zero
quotas). Also, while Article VII (4) permits captive-breeding and artificial propagation of Appendix I species for commercial
trade, controls on these operations have become more stringent over time (Table 2). Similarly, species-specific Resolutions
have been adopted for a small number of species andwhich have typically pursued the eradication of consumer demand and
elimination of illicit trade. The most notable measures have been for the African elephant, rhinos and the tiger. Concerning
the African elephant they have included one-off sales of ivory and the establishment of two bespokemonitoring systems for
elephants globally, namelyMIKE (Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants) and ETIS (Elephant Trade Information System),
with which to monitor illegal killing and population trends, and record and analyse illegal trade levels, respectively (CITES,
2014i). Measures for rhino and the tiger have included, inter alia, trade sanctions, the exertion of diplomatic pressure on
consumer states and the urged destruction of rhino horn stockpiles (Table 2; Leader-Williams, 2003 and Reeve, 2002).
Finally, in response to species-specific non-compliance regarding Appendix II species, the Review of Significant Trade (RST)
process was devised.
This aims to ensure species are not traded unsustainably through the formulation of remedial measures (e.g., export
quotas), where trade data suggest they have been (Table 2; Reeve, 2002).
Like listing decisions, the adoption of atypical measures has often been characterised by heated debate among Parties
and non-state actors, and is typified by the use vs. no-use argument that has become synonymous with CITES (e.g., Mofson,
2000 and Vincent et al., 2013). Seen by some to reflect the Convention’s imperialist history (e.g., Kievit, 2000), this debate,
it is argued, is characterised by preservationists of northern, economically developed consumer states who have sought
to halt the utilisation of wildlife and conservationists, primarily in Southern African states, who have sought to embrace
conservation through sustainable use (Abensperg-Traun, 2009; Duffy, 2013; Hutton, 2000). This was apparent in the
adoption of ranching and has characterised discourse on proposals to ranchMarine turtles, butwhich have not been adopted
to date. However, it has led to concerns about how homogeneously the Precautionary Principle has been applied to listed
species (Dickson, 2003; Kievit, 2000; Webb, 2000, 2013). The most extreme example surrounded decision-making on the
African elephant, particularly its transfer from Appendix II to Appendix I in 1989 (’t Sas-Rolfes, 2000).
Unique to this decision was the unprecedented scale of high-profile media attention it received, led by western NGOs
and animal welfare organisations (’t Sas-Rolfes, 2000; Huxley, 2000). However, it has been argued such organisations were
more concernedwith the survival of individual elephants than the long term conservation of the species, the ‘Disneyization’
of wildlife according to some (e.g., Martin, 2012a). In reality, the issue was predominantly one of contrasting wildlife
management philosophies between African elephant range states and lack of national enforcement capacity (’t Sas-Rolfes,
2000; Duffy, 2013). Even so, the media furore and the resulting decision to up list the species arguably demonstrates the
influence non-state actors can have on decision-making (see Thornton and Currey, 1991 and Duffy, 2013).
4. The effectiveness of CITES
Although hailed as the world’s most successful wildlife conservation Convention (e.g., Fuchs, 2010 and Huxley, 2000),
the effectiveness of CITES continues to be debated (e.g., ERM, 1996; IUCN, 2001; Shepherd and Nijman, 2008 and Bowman,
2013). However, from a species conservation standpoint, determining the causal contribution of CITES to species’ status is
difficult given the multiplicity of factors affecting species (Martin, 2000; IUCN, 2001; Dickson, 2003). This includes other
threats such as habitat loss and climate change as well as intrinsic and extrinsic biological factors. Consequently, CITES may
have hadmany successes, but these are not easily apparent, and cast iron proof that CITES has been effective, i.e. measurably
led to improvements in species’ status is hard to find, with few exceptions (IUCN, 2001; Kievit, 2000; Martin, 2000). This
does not prevent claims though that CITES has had greater success (e.g., CITES, 2013a), but which in reality plays down the
primary role of complimentary conservation efforts (Martin, 2000). Cases where CITES is considered to have been effective
include: the recovery of crocodilian populations (Jenkins et al., 2004; Platt and Thorbjarnarson, 2000); the recovery of the
Southern white rhino in South Africa (Amin et al., 2006); export quotas for the leopard (Panthera pardus) in Southern Africa
(Jenkins, 2000) and Suleiman markhor (Capra falconeri) in Pakistan (Frisina and Tareen, 2009); as well as annotations down
listing vicuña (Vicugña vicugña) in South America (see Table 2; McAllister et al., 2009). Generally, improvements in the
conservation status of these species followed the removal of trade bans and the advent of regulated trade, including ranching
in the case of crocodilians which bestowed an economic value on wild populations, and crucially, the involvement and buy-
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in of local communities (Table 2; UNEP-WCMC, 2013), but which are typically excluded when evaluating success in CITES
(e.g., Lichtenstein, 2011).
Although not linked to species’ status, inferences can be made about the effectiveness of CITES based on trade analyses
andpolicymovements (e.g., Carpenter et al., 2005 andRoe et al., 2002). For instance, the number ofwild birds imported to the
EU fell from1.37million in 2003 to<100,000 a year from2006 following the establishment of an EUwide import ban (UNEP-
WCMC, 2013). Similarly, demand for spotted cat and seal skins declined significantly following CITES listings in themid-late
20th century as did trade in African elephant ivory to Europe following the 1989 trade ban, all apparent CITES successes
(IUCN, 2001; Orenstein, 2013; Roe et al., 2002). However, decreasing trade in these latter examples has otherwise been
attributed to changing fashions and media campaigns, not CITES implementation per se (’t Sas-Rolfes, 2000; Stiles, 2004).
Hence, it is plausible these outcomes could have been achieved through other means such as marketing campaigns to alter
consumer demand. This again demonstrates the complexity of attributing success to CITES. Even for the African elephant
and with MIKE and ETIS, evaluating the impact of decision-making on trade and the number of animals poached, even
after experimental ivory sales is problematic (Martin et al., 2012; Stiles, 2004). Specifying the counter-factual conditions
is also difficult given the complex social, economic and governance, as well biological factors affecting poaching and trade
nationally and internationally (e.g., Burn et al., 2011).
In contrast, there is ample evidence demonstrating that the Parties to CITES are failing to control trade in many instances
(e.g., Rosen and Smith, 2010 and Phelps et al., 2010), despite the implementation of innovative and sometimes extreme
interventions (see ad hoc interventions; Table 2). Notwithstanding the complexity of factors affecting species, and although
60 species have been transferred from Appendix I to Appendix II since the inception of CITES (CITES, 2013b; UNEP-WCMC,
2013), 286 species + 20 subspecies have been up listed from Appendix II to Appendix I, which suggest, at least broadly,
that the CITES approach may be failing. The repeated re-entering of species into the RST also supports this argument (e.g.,
O’Criodain, 2011).
Affected species are diverse and include the white rhino and African elephant, most populations of which are listed in
Appendix I, but which are currently subject to record levels of poaching and trade (Biggs et al., 2013; Underwood et al.,
2013; Martin and Vigne, 2013). Similarly, the number of tigers poached for trade reached record levels in India, a tiger
stronghold, in 2012 (NTCA, 2012; Stoner and Pervushina, 2013) while other Appendix I species traded illicitly range from
the Snow leopard (Panthera uncia), Saiga antelope (Saiga tartarica), great apes and other primates, to Asian leopards, musk
deer (Moschus spp.), Asian bear species, the Tibetan antelope and slender and slow lorises (EIA, 2012; Raza et al., 2012;
Shepherd and Nijman, 2008; Stiles et al., 2013; von Meibom et al., 2010; Yang et al., 2003; Nekaris et al., 2010; Thomas,
2013; Shepherd, 2010; Shepherd and Shepherd, 2010; Li and Lu, 2014). Among Appendix II species, orchids (Phelps et al.,
2010), marine fishes and corals (Nijman, 2010; Giles et al., 2006), gastropods (Theile, 2005), and poison arrow frogs (Nijman
and Shepherd, 2010) are traded illegally, as are pythons and other reptiles, and amphibians, and includes the laundering
of wild-caught animals as captive bred (e.g., Lyons and Natusch, 2011; Nijman et al., 2012 and Rasheed, 2013). Pangolins
(Manis spp.), both in Africa and Asia, are also traded illegally in substantial numbers, despite zero export quotas for wild-
caught Asian pangolins traded commercially (Table 2; Challender, 2011 and Challender and Hywood, 2012), as are birds
and freshwater turtles and tortoises from across the Appendices (Nijman, 2010; Nijman et al., 2012; Nijman and Shepherd,
2007; Herrera and Hennessey, 2007 and Birdlife, 2011). The clandestine nature of this trade also suggests it involves many
more species but goes unrecorded (e.g., Shepherd and Shepherd, 2009). We attribute this failure to five overarching factors
that are pervasive across species and interventions.
4.1. Non-compliance
The failure of Parties, especially developing nations, to enact adequate implementing legislation, the key tenet of CITES,
undermines the Convention (Reeve, 2002). Of 180 Parties only 51% (88/173; excluding recent accessions and dependent
territories) have legislation in place that meets all the implementing requirements under the NLP (CITES, 2013c). A further
49 Parties have legislation that is considered to meet some of these requirements, while 36 Parties have legislation which
is deemed to be inadequate. In such circumstances trade sanctions could be imposed against non-compliant Parties. Yet
despite their success in bringing about compliance historically (see Sand, 2013), sanctions are generally considered to be
the last resort (Reeve, 2006), arguably because Parties are reluctant to force them on one other (Hutton, 2000; Sand, 2013).
For example, Pakistan has not been subject to sanctions despite acceding to CITES in 1976 and only very recently enacting
legislation (CITES, 2013c). Similarly, only 3 of the 85 Parties with legislation that does not meet all the implementing
requirements at present (Djibouti, Somalia and Mauritania) have sanctions imposed for non-compliance on legislation
grounds (CITES, 2014d).
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of CITES as a global mechanism to regulate wildlife trade is handicapped by fundamental
fault lines among the international community in terms of governance, state–society relations (e.g., rule of law), culture
and enforcement capacity (Martin, 2000). For example, ineffective enforcement, insufficient border controls, poor domestic
trade controls and corruption and collusion, especially in developing countries and trade and consumer hotspots, impedes
effective implementation (e.g., Duckworth et al., 2012; McFadden, 1987 and Reeve, 2002). Likewise, under-resourcing of
wildlife agencies, the low priority given to wildlife trade by enforcement agencies generally and the failure to treat illegal
wildlife trade as a serious crime all work synergistically to create a weak deterrent effect nationally and internationally (e.g.,
St John et al., 2012; Wellsmith, 2011 and Shepherd, 2010). These factors are manifested in on-going illegal trade, export
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quotas being exceeded, the laundering of species, and a failure to implement ad hoc species-specific interventions (see
Table 2; e.g., Leader-Williams, 2003; von Meibom et al., 2010; Shepherd and Nijman, 2008; Shepherd et al., 2012; Stengel
et al., 2011; Challender, 2011; Rosen and Smith, 2010; Natusch and Lyons, 2012 and Nijman and Shepherd, 2012). Although
the Parties have responded to governance issues, for example by commissioning voluntarywildlife trade policy reviews (see
Res. Conf. 15.2), only four Parties have conducted these to date, and non-compliance with biennial reporting means there
is limited knowledge of implementation and enforcement within and among Parties (Reeve, 2006). Yet, there is a clear
need for an understanding of issues inhibiting effective governance if better compliance is to be achieved and interventions
implemented effectively.
4.2. Over reliance on regulation
Although there is scope to improve enforcement of wildlife trade regulations in many instances, there is growing
recognition that a predominant reliance on regulation is proving insufficient to control trade and that additional
interventions are needed urgently (e.g., Drury, 2011; Rosen and Smith, 2010 and Veríssimo et al., 2012). This is reflected in
trade-driven population declines of many listed-species (e.g., Giles et al., 2006; Lyons and Natusch, 2011 and Theile, 2005)
and is particularly apparent where high-value species are concerned, illicit trade in many of which (e.g., Asian pangolins,
white rhino and the African elephant) is currently increasing or at conspicuous levels (see Challender and MacMillan,
2014). For example, despite high-level political and financial commitment to tiger conservation in the last 40 years, and
the pledging of USD113.8 million by tiger range States to directly tackle poaching over the first 5 years of the Global Tiger
Recovery Programme (GTRP, 2012), global tiger populations remain in decline.
Relying on regulation also places the cost of conservation on developing countries, which harbour most CITES-listed
species. Yet, this is unsustainable in the long-term due to politico-economic reasons and remains subject to external
(e.g. international aid and NGO) funding but which is not guaranteed (see Res. Conf. 9.14, Rev. CoP15; Res. Conf. 10.10,
Rev. CoP16; Res. Conf, 16.9; Bulte and Damania, 2005 andWalston et al., 2010). For instance, in light of the recent poaching
crisis the cost of protecting elephants in east, west and central Africa and rhinos in South Africa alone has been estimated at
USD384million and USD400million a year respectively, and rising, but with no guarantee of success in controlling poaching
and trade (Martin, 2012b; Martin et al., 2012).
Strict application of trade controls, especially bans, is not inherently beneficial either because trade may persist, be it in
a clandestine manner, and have adverse outcomes in conservation terms. For instance, increased profitability from inflated
black market prices can incentivise or even exacerbate poaching and attract the engagement of organised criminality (’t
Sas-Rolfes, 2000; Biggs et al., 2013). Although data on the profitability of illicit trades is difficult to obtain, sharp increases in
the price of rhino horn followed the 1977 rhino trade ban, as did poaching and speculative stockpiling of horns, apparently
due to the high profits that could bemade, andwhich led to the local extinction of Black rhino (Diceros bicornis) in at least 18
range states (’t Sas-Rolfes, 2000; Leader-Williams, 2003). Steep price increases for whalemeat were also apparent following
the government crackdown on whaling in Korea in 2004, and prices for a number of high-value CITES-listed species are
currently increasing (MacMillan andHan, 2011; Challender andMacMillan, 2014). Also, the surreptitious nature of this trade
frustrates assessments of sustainability, with knowledge typically limited to seizures or data from market surveys, and is a
major concern, especially for species where trade is primarily illegal (e.g., Asian pangolins; Nijman, 2010 and Barber-Meyer,
2010).
Moreover, relying on regulation is also inadequate because it fails to address the real drivers of trade including rural
poverty, growing relative poverty nationally and internationally, and consumer demand (also see Section 3.4; Challender
andMacMillan, 2014; Roe et al., 2002 andDrury, 2011). As such, parallels have been drawn against the reliance on regulation
in CITES and the failed ‘war on drugs’, which favoured increasing investment in enforcement effort over actions to tackle
drug abuse directly (e.g., Challender and MacMillan, 2014; Poret and Téjédo, 2006 and Werb et al., 2013). In conservation
terms, regulation implementing CITES in much of the developing world reduces the complex nature of wildlife trade,
which is intrinsically linked to poverty alleviation, tenure rights, rural livelihoods and cultural traditions, into a simple
law enforcement problem (Roe et al., 2002; Velásquez Gomar and Stringer, 2011). Yet, this approach typically translates
into disincentives for conservation by restricting the direct use of wildlife on which rural communities depend socio-
economically (e.g., for food, income and trade) and culturally (e.g., ceremonial hunting; see Abdullah et al., 2011; Donovan,
2004 and MacMillan and Nguyen, 2014). As examples, Malaysia and Botswana have recently introduced new legislation
further restricting the use of many species by local communities. Although CITES has recognised this complexity, most
recently at CoP16 (see Table 1), decisions to list species in CITES remain focused on trade controls, and socio-economic
considerations are considered to be the prerogative of the Parties (Cooney and Abensperg-Traun, 2013; CITES, 2002;Mathur,
2009). However, this is unrealistic in immediate terms as Parties generally have made little provision for local communities
in implementing CITES, and results in a dichotomy between globally defined conservation goals and socio-economic realities
in the developing world (see Abensperg-Traun, 2009 and Challender and MacMillan, 2014).
Crucially, this approach also typically fails to generate positive incentives for conservation and therefore overlooks
any potential benefits from local communities as conservation partners. For instance, community-based approaches
have demonstrated the potential to deliver positive outcomes for species conservation and local, economic development
(Murphree, 2009; Velásquez Gomar and Stringer, 2011). Examples include community management of the vicuña (Vicugña
vicugña) and ranching of the Broad-snouted cayman (Caiman latirostris) in South America, projects such as CAMPFIRE
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(Community Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources) in Southern Africa, and community-based trophy
hunting of the Suleiman markhor in Pakistan (Abensperg-Traun et al., 2011; McAllister et al., 2009; Wheeler and Domingo,
1997; Taylor, 2009). Important opportunities therefore exist by engaging local communities in implementing CITES though
further research and evaluation are necessary to understand the approaches that have and have not been effective, where,
and the reasons why (Roe et al., 2009; Murphree, 2009; Abensperg-Traun et al., 2011).
4.3. Lack of knowledge and monitoring of listed species
A lack of knowledge of listed species, in particular population levels, current offtake levels and sustainable harvest rates,
undermines CITES, specifically its scientific integrity relating to themaking of NDFs (Parsons et al., 2010; Phelps et al., 2010;
UNEP-WCMC, 2013). Non-detriment findings are fundamental to the Convention’s effectiveness because they apply to all
Appendix II (or 97% of) listed species. However, robust NDFs typically prove problematic because most listed species are
found in developing countries, where baseline population data and information on offtake levels are lacking, as are the
financial and technical resources required to compile these data (Abensperg-Traun et al., 2011; UNEP-WCMC, 2013; de
Angelis, 2012). Although CITES has responded by providing guidance on, and holding workshops on the making of NDFs
(e.g., in Cancun, Mexico in 2008, also see Rosser and Haywood, 2002), a dearth of knowledge of listed species and harvest
rates continues to undermine the NDF process (Smith et al., 2010; UNEP-WCMC, 2013).
Emanating from the Cancun workshop, Smith et al. (2010) highlight ten research areas that could support the making
of NDFs specifically, and inter alia, they include the impacts of harvesting on wildlife populations, the relationship between
information availability and risk in making NDFs, guidance on implementing adaptive management, and enterprises based
on the harvesting of listed-species. Enterprises are important because they could simultaneously deliver development
benefits to local communities and contribute to species conservation (e.g., through Community Based Natural Resource
Management (CBNRM) approaches), though further research on engaging communities in implementation is needed (see
Section 3.2; Abensperg-Traun et al., 2011). Similarly, long-term population monitoring (either exact or through adaptive
management approaches) could contribute tomakingNDFs, but in combinationwith policy analyses could also contribute to
understanding the effectiveness of CITES (e.g., Carpenter et al., 2005), but also commands further research (see Section 4.2).
4.4. CITES ignores market forces
Historically, changing demand for wildlife, driven by consumer preferences, has arguably been more influential in
controlling wildlife trade than regulation, at least in the west (Abensperg-Traun, 2009; Phillip et al., 2009; Roe et al., 2002).
For example, reduced demand for ivory and animal fur clothing in Europe post-1989 has been attributed to the creation
of a ‘stigma effect’ associated with its procurement (’t Sas-Rolfes, 2000; Stiles, 2004). However, CITES functions under the
assumption that trade controls work in isolation of market forces (Roe et al., 2002). This is despite acknowledgement of the
economic nature of trade and importance of market forces in decision-making (Table 1). For instance, there is no explicit
mandate in the listing criteria (Res. Conf. 9.24; Rev. CoP16) to consider markets, especially demand factors (e.g., consumer
preferences, social norms driving consumption, or demand elasticity). Proponents of amendments to the Appendices are
only required to provide information on how proposed changes to species’ listings will ‘affect the nature of trade’ (e.g., the
purpose and source of trade, and derivatives in trade), but are not required to evaluate their impact on markets and which
are ostensibly excluded from decision-making. This is unrealistic though because it is known that demand can serve to
undermine trade controls (e.g., Underwood et al., 2013; Challender, 2011 and Biggs et al., 2013), and changes to species’
listings can stimulate trade (e.g. Rivalan et al., 2007) and increase prices, which have resulted in adverse outcomes for CITES-
listed species (e.g., Rivalan et al., 2007 and Leader-Williams, 2003).
Similarly, a number of species-specific Resolutions have recognised market forces (see ad hoc interventions; Table 2),
which typically urge the reduction and elimination of demand for given species and/or derivatives traded illegally, but
which also make assumptions about demand. Many of the species for which Resolutions have been adopted are in demand
in East Asia where wildlife consumption as luxury foods, ingredients in traditional medicines, and as curios is culturally
embedded, having been used for hundreds or thousands of years. In contrast to the west, it also remains socially acceptable
in some cases and is used to impart social status (Drury, 2011; Zhang and Yin, 2014). Moreover, evidence also suggests that
demand for highly threatened and high-value species in East Asia is growing, and may be price-inelastic (e.g., Biggs et al.,
2013), that is quantity of a given product consumed changes little with a proportionate increase in price. This has important
implications for trade interventions (e.g., Challender and MacMillan, 2014). Growing demand, as a result of rapid growth
and increasing affluence in East and Southeast Asia, for example China and Vietnam have averaged close to 9% growth over
the last two decades (IMF, 2012), means a now unprecedented number of potential consumers (Drury, 2011; Nijman, 2010).
Similarly, potentially price-inelastic demand means that trade controls will, theoretically at least, lead to large increases
in the price of wildlife, but have only a minor impact on the quantity of wildlife demanded (IUCN, 2001; Challender and
MacMillan, 2014). These factors are important because it is evident that what has worked in the west to alter demand may
not necessarily be effective in East Asia. In such circumstances a more appropriate response could be to increase supply
(e.g., through ranching, wildlife farming or regulated trade; Bulte and Damania, 2005), and which in theory could reduce
prices for wildlife traded illegally, and hence poaching incentives (Biggs et al., 2013). Similar approaches have previously
brought about conservation successes (e.g., for crocodilians; Table 2; Hutton and Webb, 2003).
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However, the impact of such interventions remains uncertain and further research is needed into both demand and
supply-side interventions and their impacts on species and markets (e.g., incentives to poach and consumer demand), and
their links to livelihoods. For example, increasing supply could induce changes in consumer behaviour leading to higher
levels of demand, while eliminating demand may not result in optimal conservation outcomes where species provide
important contributions to livelihoods (e.g., Lombard and du Plessis, 2003). Although recent research has examined wildlife
consumption in East Asia it has focused on only a few species to date (e.g., Drury, 2011; Dutton et al., 2011 and Gratwicke
et al., 2008a), and there remains little evidence of demand reduction initiatives having led to measurable changes in
consumer behaviour (Veríssimo et al., 2012). Similarly, while research has examined the conditions under which supply-
side interventionsmay be effective, further research into their feasibility is needed, addressing issues such as legal vs. illegal
supply chain costs and the substitutability of products (e.g., Biggs et al., 2013 and Phelps et al., 2013).
4.5. Influence among CITES actors
Despite a scientific basis for listing species in the Appendices, decisions continue to be made for reasons ranging from
the emotional to political (see Section 2.2; Dickson, 2003 and Vincent et al., 2013). For instance, prior to the advent of
electronic voting at CoP14 (2007), Parties could be seen following the lead of other, arguably influential nationswhen casting
votes (Martin, 2000). While recognising that CITES is a political endeavour with inherent vested interests, in such instances
and where decision-making deviates from a scientific basis it damages the Convention’s credibility (e.g., by misapplying
trade controls) potentially diluting funding for listed species and overburdening the Appendices (Martin, 2000; Mofson,
2000). Unwarranted retention, inclusion or up listing of species’ would establish unnecessarily strict trade controls, with
potentially adverse implications for rural livelihoods, while failure to up list or include species’ in need of trade regulation
could result in potentially unsustainable trade. Unfortunately, broad evaluation of the appropriateness of listing decisions
is frustrated by the complexity of determining the effectiveness of CITES (see Section 3). However, CITES has been criticised
for an over-representation of charismatic mega-fauna and heterogeneous application of the Precautionary Principle, which
raises questions about decision-making in amending the Appendices (e.g., Dickson, 2003; Martin, 2000 and Webb, 2000,
2013). Yet, despite its importance to the determination of trade controls the decision-making process has received little
research attention to date (though see Gehring and Ruffing, 2008). Disentangling vested interests from scientific arguments
though is essential to better understanding decision-making and thereby the effectiveness of CITES.
While both pro-trade and anti-trade lobbies engage in CITES, it has also been argued that non-state actors, principally
NGOs, in pursuit of their own, often very specific agendas, actively seek to, and do, exert substantial influence on CITES
decision-making. In particular, narrowing debate to the application of trade controls (e.g., Bryant, 2009; Duffy, 2013;
O’Criodain, 2011 and Vincent et al., 2013). This is achieved by building powerful alliances with receptive Parties and ‘soft-
steering’ (i.e. appealing to science to enhance the legitimacy of their own policy positions; see Bryant, 2009; Duffy, 2013
and Riise, 2004). A good example is the manner in which animal welfare and conservation NGOs shaped global debate
on the African elephant and claimed a moral victory when the species was up listed to Appendix I (see Duffy, 2013 and
Thornton and Currey, 1991). More recently, this narrow approach has been advocated through calls for strict application
of the Precautionary Principle (e.g., Born Free, 2007 and Thorson and Wold, 2010). This is particularly noticeable where
fundraiser-friendly mega-fauna are concerned (Dickson, 2003; Webb, 2013). Again, such influence can work to undermine
CITES. For example, NGOs influenced the decision not to down list the Tanimbar corella (Cacatua goffini) from Appendix I
to Appendix II in 1994 (CoP9), which had arguably been subject to an unwarranted up listing in 1992 (CoP8), not because
it had been inappropriately listed, but because it would have meant NGOs having to report back to their supporters that
they were incorrect in supporting the initial up listing, and which would risk damaging their ‘expert’ status (see Jepson,
2003). Such examples have led some to consider western NGOs as eco-colonialists, drawing comparisons between them
and imperialist actors in the Convention’s history (e.g., Carpenter et al., 2005 and Kievit, 2000). Moreover, these arguments
also suggest that evaluation of the role that non-state actors play in CITES, particularly NGOs, and the scope and implications
of their engagement is needed ifwe are to better understand decision-making, and implement informed interventionswhich
reflect the conservation needs of trade-threatened species.
5. Towards a research agenda to informmulti-faceted interventions
Current, regulatory interventions defined at the international level are failing to control seemingly unsustainable trade
in many CITES listed species and though CITES may be being effective in many cases this is not easily apparent. Where
existing interventions have proved successful and led to measurable improvements in species’ conservation status, they
have typically involved the sustainable use of species and regulatory measures have been augmented with buy-in from
local communities, efforts to alter consumer demand (e.g., media campaigns) and in certain circumstances supply-side
interventions (e.g., ranching). To more effectively conserve trade-threatened species therefore we argue that a broader
suite of interventions is needed within CITES and which go beyond regulation to reflect the socio-economic, cultural, and
economic complexity of wildlife trade. While such interventions will need to be underpinned by regulation, crucially they
should be species- and context-specific; they may necessitate devolution of land or resource tenure, or other incentives
to local communities to obtain their buy-in to implementing CITES; they may require additional demand or supply based
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interventions, informed through research into consumer preferences, demand factors and livelihood considerations; they
will likely mean accounting for illegal as well as legal trade (e.g., in CITES reporting), and their effectiveness should be
measured against the delivery of benefits to local livelihoods as well species’ population trends. Although CITES currently
possesses many of the provisions to implement these interventions (e.g., the ability of Parties to devolve land/resource
tenure), implementation will require full consideration of factors such as markets, consumer demand and local community
engagement in listing-decisions, and which represents a move away from a principally regulatory approach. However, this
will also necessitate careful analysis of the Convention text to determine its capacity to deal with this broader approach,
potential alterations to the Listing Criteria, and the likely adoption of new Resolutions. Fundamentally though, it will require
political will on the part of the Parties. To inform these interventions an intensive research effort is needed and below we
outline six key areas where we assert attention should be focused:
5.1. Factors undermining wildlife trade governance at the national level
Non-compliance has meant there is little understanding of CITES implementation at the national level, or factors
impeding it. Existing research in this area has tended to focus on the scale and extent of non-compliance (e.g., Shepherd and
Nijman, 2008 and Shepherd, 2010), on factors undermining regulation more broadly (e.g., Smith et al., 2003 andWellsmith,
2011), or sought to theorise non-compliance and rule-breaking behaviour (e.g., Keane et al., 2008 and Rowcliffe et al., 2004).
However, despite regulation and enforcement being central to CITES there is a notable lack of in-depth, peer-reviewed
research examining the factors inhibiting effective implementation within and among Parties, for instance, institutional
factors (e.g., enforcement agency structure, cultural norms, staff motivation) or social and cultural factors (e.g., state–society
relations, rule of law; exceptions include Carpenter et al., 2005 and Robinson et al., 2010; also see Webb, 2013). Yet,
understanding these issues is critical if remedial measures are to be taken facilitating more effective implementation of
CITES.
5.2. Determining sustainable harvest rates for, and adaptive management of CITES species
To inform decision-making in CITES and to underpin NDFs, there is a need to determine sustainable harvest rates for
listed species, to understand their population ecology and to better monitor populations (UNEP-WCMC, 2013; Phelps et al.,
2010). To inform NDFs Smith et al. (2010) advocate research on the impact of harvesting on populations and ecosystems,
case studies, guidance on adaptive management of species, and among other areas, enterprises based on the harvesting of
listed species given their potential to deliver conservation gains and address rural poverty. However, in informing NDFs, and
given impediments (e.g., lack of resources) to collecting precise data on most species, consideration should also be given to
determinants of finding non-detriment (e.g., incorporating traditional ecological knowledge in to theNDF process). Adaptive
management approaches should also be considered as a proxy for more traditional populationmonitoring, and which could
remain robust but would remove the need for exactitude in data collection (Abensperg-Traun et al., 2011). Smith et al.
(2010) also advocate research on enterprises andwhich should include examiningmarkets for specific species and products
at local to international levels, in order to assess their feasibility, and how enterprises could contribute to implementation of
CITES (e.g., by informing NDFs). Finally, research should include evaluation of the status of species and temporal population
trends, either precisely or based on adaptivemanagementmeasures. Importantly, focusing on adaptivemanagement would
not only provide a less resource intensivemeans ofmonitoring populations, but could remain robust (see Smith et al., 2010),
and in combination with analyses of trade, policy movements and other conservation initiatives (e.g., demandmanagement
measures), could provide greater evidence for the effectiveness, or not, of CITES (e.g., Carpenter et al., 2005).
5.3. Gaining the buy-in of local communities in implementing CITES
Community-basedwildlifemanagement approaches have had notable success in the conservation of CITES-listed species
and delivered socio-economic benefits to rural communities (e.g., Frisina and Tareen, 2009 and Abensperg-Traun et al.,
2011). Valuable opportunities therefore exist on both these fronts despite the Parties having made few such provisions
to date (Abensperg-Traun, 2009). Crucially, this approach also has the potential to remove current disincentives and
generate positive incentives for conserving listed species, for example through sustainable use, or payments for protecting
populations (e.g., Clements et al., 2013 and Dinerstein et al., 2012). However, if communities are to genuinely buy-in to
conservation in the long term, this will likely necessitate going beyond payment systems, whichmay not always incentivise
conservation (e.g., Harihar et al., 2014), to direct negotiations to determinewhat communities want from such partnerships.
For example, greater disposable income, empowerment, land or resource tenure, a start-up enterprise, permission to
sustainably harvest listed species, or access to schools and health services (Abensperg-Traun et al., 2011; Challender and
MacMillan, 2014; MacMillan and Nguyen, 2014; Wheeler and Domingo, 1997). This represents a more holistic CBNRM
approachbut despite success to date, it requires further research in order to optimise existingmodels to understandwhat has
and has not worked, where, and the reasons why (Murphree, 2009; Roe et al., 2009). Furthermore, while sub-Saharan Africa,
South America and South Asia boast good examples of CBNRM projects, Southeast Asia does not, yet its position as an illegal
trade hotspot suggests it should be a research priority (Duckworth et al., 2012; Nijman, 2010). Likewise, research should
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examine opportunities for synergy between CBNRM, export quotas and enterprises based on the harvesting of listed species,
such as certification schemes, which could also deliver mutual benefits to local communities and species conservation (Aziz
et al., 2013).
5.4. Supply and demand based market interventions
Conserving trade-threatened species necessitates understandingmarkets (Bulte and Damania, 2005). Yet, notwithstand-
ing earlier examples, there is little evidence of targeted demand reduction campaigns havingmeasurably changed consumer
behaviour, particularly in East Asia, where demand for high-value species in particular is increasing (e.g., Challender and
MacMillan, 2014). Also, given the potential conservation gains from supply-side measures future interventions should con-
sider strategies to increase supply as well, informed through an understanding of consumer preferences, specific markets
and local livelihood considerations.
Reducing demand should, all other things being equal, reduce consumption of given species, thereby alleviating harvest
pressure on wild populations. To do so requires an in-depth understanding of demand but existing research has focused
on only a few species to date (e.g., tiger parts and bear bile—Drury, 2011; Dutton et al., 2011 and Gratwicke et al., 2008a).
There is an urgent need therefore, for research on the consumption and/or procurement of many highly-threatened species
(e.g., Challender and MacMillan, 2014), and which should seek to understand consumer preferences, key attributes of
species in demand (e.g., wild vs. farmed) and the social function they perform, a willingness to accept to substitutes, and
the social dynamics of consumption (Challender and MacMillan, 2014; Drury, 2011). This requires an interdisciplinary
approach combining consumer psychology, social marketing and education (Drury, 2009; Veríssimo et al., 2012). From a
socialmarketing perspective this approach is critical to ensure that interventions go beyond raising awareness aboutwildlife
consumption. To be effective target audiences need to be reachedwith the right message through the right communications
medium and initiatives should be evaluated in measurable terms, i.e. how effective they are in bringing about changes in
consumption (Challender and MacMillan, 2014).
Increasing supply through regulated trade, ranching or wildlife farming should also be considered given the potential to
reduce the price of wildlife, and poaching incentives (Bulte and Damania, 2005). However, this also necessitates research
into the conditions under which these measures are likely to be effective, as well as potential adverse impacts. For example,
it is argued poaching incentives may be reduced only where laundering can be prevented, where a legal supply can reach
the market more reliably and cost-effectively than illegal supply, where demand does not escalate to dangerous levels,
and where farmed products are direct substitutes for wild products (Biggs et al., 2013). It has also been posited that a
number of biophysical, market and regulatory conditions are necessary for supply-side interventions to be effective, but
again they require further research and greater evaluation (Phelps et al., 2013). Although supply-side policies do have their
opponents (e.g., Gratwicke et al., 2008b), in reality these approaches have been subject to little research (Damania and Bulte,
2007; though see Brooks et al., 2010 and Drury, 2009) and the predicament facing many trade-threatened species therefore
commands interventions informed through further in-depth, objective research and which should include evaluation of
strategies to increase supply.
5.5. Means of quantifying illicit trade
Many CITES species are traded illicitly but as this trade is not recorded centrally, determining its extent and sustainability
is inherently difficult. However, new methods are being applied to determine such parameters and trade dynamics
but they require further application, evaluation, and testing. This includes application of ecological field methodologies
(e.g., mark-recapture approaches and occupancy modelling), wildlife forensics, advanced modelling (e.g., Underwood et al.,
2013), and indirect questioning. For example, Barber-Meyer (2010) has proposed using occupancy modelling to more
accurately estimate trade volumes from repeat market surveys and Baker et al. (2007) and Raza et al. (2012) have applied
capture–recapture methods, a form of mark-recapture approach, to estimate the extent of illicit trade involving the North
Pacific minke whale (Balaenoptera acutorostratra ssp.) and the leopard, respectively. Given the potential of such methods to
improve the accuracy of illegal trade estimates and to directly inform decision-making and policy (e.g., Burn et al., 2011) we
advocate their further application and testing.
5.6. Political processes and influence within CITES
Despite the importance of listing-decisions to determining trade controls for CITES-listed species, the decision-making
process itself has received very little research attention to date (exceptions are Gehring and Ruffing, 2008 and Duffy, 2013).
However, in light of evidence suggesting decision-making can be, and is, heavily influenced by a range of actors, and which
can serve to undermine the Convention’s scientific credibility, research seeking to understand this process, and the scope
and implications of influence from actors, both state and non-state and pro-trade and anti-trade lobbies, is needed. This
is to elucidate such influence, disentangle vested interests from scientific arguments, and inform potential reforms to this
process if informed interventions which reflect the conservation needs of species are to be adopted.
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6. Conclusion
International trade in wildlife remains a key threat to biodiversity and CITES remains the framework through which it is
controlled. Although difficult to measure CITES cannot define many measurable conservation successes and its Parties are
failing to prevent seemingly unsustainable trade in many listed species. This is because many Parties are non-compliant,
CITES over relies on regulation, there remains a lack of knowledge and monitoring of CITES species, and the Convention
is ignorant of market forces in decision-making and implementation terms. Influence among CITES actors also means that
decision-making may not reflect the conservation needs of trade-threatened species. To more effectively manage trade,
interventions need to go beyond regulation and should be multifaceted reflecting the complexity of wildlife trade and its
drivers. However, this necessitates a concerted research effort into factors undermining wildlife trade governance at the
national level; sustainable harvest rates and adaptivemanagement of CITES species; gaining the buy-in of local communities
in implementing CITES; supply and demand based market interventions; and means of quantifying illicit trade. Only by
conducting research in these areas, and into decision-making in CITES can we hope to improve compliance and decision-
making, and inform and implement interventions with which to conserve trade-threatened species in the long-term.
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